Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism

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Case 62-2
UN v. South Africa (1962-1994: Apartheid; Namibia)

Case 85-1
US, Commonwealth v. South Africa (1985-91: Apartheid)

| Chronology of Key Events | Goals of Sender Country | Response to Target Country |
Attitude of Other Countries | Economic Impact | Assessment | Author's Summary |
Bibliography |

Goals of Sender Country

UN General Assembly
Goals are to end apartheid, possibly leading to black majority rule; terminate South African presence in Namibia. (Doxey 1980, 60-65) UN Security Council Resolution 418: "[s]trongly condemning the South African Government for its acts of repression, its defiant continuance of the system of apartheid and its attacks against neighbouring independent States…; Decides that all States shall cease forthwith any provision to South Africa of arms and related material of all types, … and shall cease as well the provision of all types of equipment and supplies and grants of licensing arrangements for the manufacture or maintenance of the aforementioned.…" (UN Security Council S/RES/418, 4 November 1977)

United States

US Vice President Walter F. Mondale, speaking in South Africa, 20 May 1977:
"Every citizen should have the right to vote and every vote should be equally weighted." (Chettle 11)

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker, in April 1981 meeting with South African officials, stresses that "top U.S. priority [in southern Africa] is to stop Soviet encroachment." (Baker 8-10, 107-08)

Crocker concentrates on settlement of disputes in Angola, Namibia, believing that "Regional security would diminish white South Africans' siege mentality, produced by their country's isolation in the region, and increase their willingness to embark on a program of serious reform. Based on this premise, external pressures, such as public criticism and sanctions, would be counterproductive, exacerbate white fears, and increase government intransigence." (Baker 9-10)

President Ronald Reagan, in announcing September 1985 sanctions:
"Yes, we in America, because of what we are and what we stand for, have influence to do good. We also have immense potential to make things worse. Before taking fateful steps, we must ponder the key question: Are we helping to change the system? Or are we punishing the blacks whom we seek to help? American policy through several administrations has been to use our influence and our leverage against apartheid, not against innocent people who are the victims of apartheid." (Washington Post, 10 September 1985, A12)

US Congress
Section 311 of Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 provides for termination of sanctions if South African government takes following steps: "(1) releases all persons persecuted for their political beliefs or detained unduly without trial and Nelson Mandela from prison; (2) repeals the state of emergency...and releases all detainees held under such state of emergency; (3) unbans democratic political parties and permits the free exercise by South Africans of all races of the right to form political parties, express political opinions, and otherwise participate in the political process; (4) repeals the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act and institutes no other measures with the same purposes; and (5) agrees to enter into good faith negotiations with truly representative members of the black majority without preconditions."

Section 311 also provides for modification of any sanctions if president determines that South Africa has taken "three of the four actions listed in paragraphs (2) through (5)" and "made substantial progress toward dismantling the system of apartheid and establishing a nonracial democracy." (Lipton 1988, 145)

Howard Wolpe (D-MI), Chairman of House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa:
"Sanctions aren't a quick fix for apartheid. There is a long, protracted struggle in process, and [sanctions] are part of a pattern of developments that will shorten this time frame and accelerate the onset of negotiations." (Wall Street Journal, 21 September 1987, 24)

President George Bush:
"Lifting the sanctions at this time is the right thing to do in order to encourage continued change in his country, to help provide a more stable and dynamic economy in which the blacks of South Africa can participate." (Reuters, 10 July 1991)

Commonwealth of Nations
"African and Asian countries have used the Commonwealth as a particular source of pressure on South Africa.... Commonwealth pressures also contributed to the UK's gradual ending of its defence links with South Africa....Over the last decade, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have gradually shifted to support for sanctions against South Africa, leaving the UK increasingly isolated within the Commonwealth.... Elsewhere in the Commonwealth, India was the first country to sever trade (and all other) relations with South Africa in 1964, and has since had no official relations or commerce. Among the African countries, Nigeria has taken a lead in calling for economic sanctions, and has taken punitive action against some transnational companies involved in South Africa." (Lipton 1988, 16, 20)

Response of Target Country

John H. Chettle
Limited progress is made by early 1980s in race relations, for example, desegregation of some public facilities, permanent presence of Africans accepted in designated white areas, race-neutral labor legislation, significant recognition of black trade unions. (Chettle 50-55, 65, 67-68)

Margaret P. Doxey
"South Africa developed close trading links with France and Japan; military equipment was obtained from France ... and in return France became an important purchaser of South African uranium." (Doxey 1980, 109)

New York Times
"So far, Pretoria has managed to stay ahead by paying a premium and keeping details of oil purchases secret. Disclosure of oil transactions is punishable by large fines and long prison sentences....To achieve a measure of energy security, the country has spent millions of dollars to build up an oil stockpile in disused coal mines and specially built tank farms. The supply is intended to cover consumption for six months to two years....Government officials predict that the Sasol oil-from-coal plants will meet more than 40 percent of South Africa's oil needs by the mid-1980s." (New York Times, 21 March 1983, D7; Bissell 83-85)

"... the South Africans pursued a number of strategies designed to heighten their ability to withstand potential American pressures: (1) establishment of intense economic ties in other directions, as with Taiwan and Israel; (2) the pursuit of technological self-sufficiency; (3) maximizing the value of exports and capitalizing on good fortune like the skyrocketing price of gold in 1979-80; and (4) pointing out to the US and others the collateral damage that sanctions would wreak on nearby black states in southern Africa." (Bissell 93)

South Africa's tools for countering sanctions include import substitution (partly through technology licensing); "sanctions busting" (transshipment, false labeling); adjustments in macroeconomic policies (exchange controls, dual exchange rate system). (Lewis 75)

President P.W. Botha
In his first major policy statement after declaring first state of emergency: "We have never given in to outside demands and we are not going to do so. South Africa's problems will be solved by South Africans and not by foreigners. We are not going to be deterred from doing what we think best, nor will we be forced into doing what we don't want to do." (Washington Post, 16 August 1985, A1)

When asked to adopt reforms to ward off sanctions, [1986]: "You're giving me a choice. If we don't do these things, we'll be poorer, and if we do them, we will lose control. You and I have both lived poor and we can live poor again, but we cannot lose control." (Journal of Commerce, 24 September 1991, 8A)

Deputy Foreign Minister Louis Nel
Releasing brochure intended to influence Senate vote on sanctions in September 1985: "Let us be frank; our neighboring states will suffer before we do. Those measures will have an impact on the whole of southern Africa, and South Africa will be better able to absorb them than its neighbors. The choice is between sanctions on the one hand and political, social and economic progress on the other." (Washington Post, 6 September 1985, A1)

Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha
During fall 1986 congressional debate on overturning Reagan's veto of CAAA, with help of Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), Botha calls Senators Charles E. Grassley (R-IA), Edward Zorinsky (D-NE) threatening to retaliate against sanctions by cutting off grain purchases from US. Both senators nevertheless vote to override. (Washington Post, New York Times, 3 October 1986, A1; Massie 619)

Private Sector
Anticipating possible freeze of bank accounts in US, most South Africans move their deposits offshore, primarily to Switzerland, which already "handles most of South Africa's gold transactions" according to spokesman for major US bank. (Journal of Commerce, 28 July 1986, 3A)

Opposition
Archbishop Desmond Tutu to the House Subcommittee on Africa after winning the Nobel Peace Prize in late 1994, "We don't want our chains made more comfortable. We want them removed." (Quoted in Massie, 562)

Reverend Allan Boesak in a June 1985 speech calling on the General Synod of the United Church of Christ in the United States to support sanctions and disinvestment, "You will surely ask whether your action will make us suffer. But you will begin to understand if you learn as a woman said on Friday in Johannesburg, that there is a difference between suffering in hopelessness and suffering with hope." (Quoted in Massie, 574)

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) issues a statement in November 1985 endorsing sanctions, "All forms of international pressure on the South African government-including disinvestment or the threat of disinvestment-are an essential and effective form of pressure on the South African regime." (Quoted in Massie 598)

Zulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi agrees to inclusion in a series of American, European advertisements opposing disinvestment; is quoted as saying, "Those who advocate trade sanctions and economic withdrawal to help my people and punish the whites in South Africa may be killing us with kindness. What we need is not disengagement, but full foreign participation in South Africa's overall economic development to create more jobs, higher wages, and better training opportunities. I am no apologist for apartheid but a realist who knows that a job may make the difference between living or starving for many black families in South Africa." (Quoted in Massie 361).

In late 1985, Buthelezi criticizes COSATU, creates alternative union, "Those who have supported sanctions so far from inside have done so as surrogates for the ANC." (Quoted in Massie 598)

Attitude of Other Countries

United Kingdom, 1981
"British business and political leaders are concerned about not antagonizing their important trade partners in black Africa, but are not, under current circumstances, willing to reduce trade substantially with South Africa or to withdraw British investments. Avoiding this choice is a key objective of British policy." (Study Commission 303)

West Germany, 1981
"The German government does not support economic sanctions, trade boycotts, or prohibitions on investments." (Study Commission 305)

European Community
"All EC members subscribe to the EC sanctions package of September 1986.... The Thatcher government opposes further economic sanctions, and only reluctantly agreed to participate in the recent Commonwealth and EC measures, having whittled away the compulsory elements of these as far as possible. The Kohl administration in West Germany and the Portuguese government share Mrs Thatcher's reluctance to impose further sanctions. But all three governments have gradually shifted their position, probably mainly in response to developments in the USA. The policy of France used to lag behind that of the UK and USA.... Then, in July 1985, [France] unexpectedly took a number of initiatives on South Africa.... However, France continued to supply nuclear exports and maintenance for Koeberg [French-supplied commercial nuclear power project in South Africa], in accordance with its 1979 contract for the nuclear plant." (Lipton 1988, 18-19)

Scandinavian Countries
In October 1985, foreign ministers of Nordic Council (representing Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden) approve "Nordic Program of Action against South Africa" calling for mandatory UN sanctions and, in the meantime, unilateral restrictions on investment, loans, certain goods (e.g., arms, oil, computers, krugerrands). In early 1986, Denmark bans imports of coal from South Africa; a few months later, it becomes "the first European country to ban all trade in goods and services (with the exception of imports of raw phosphate, vermiculite and tanning extracts)." In early 1985, Sweden closes loopholes in earlier sanctions, tightens restrictions on investment in South Africa. In 1987, both Sweden, Norway impose nearly comprehensive trade, investment bans against South Africa, with limited exceptions for some raw materials. Norway's ban includes shipping of North Sea oil; measure is strongly opposed by Norwegian shipping industry. Scandinavian countries are among leading donors to so-called front-line states (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe). (Financial Times, 21 February 1985, 2; Lipton 1988, 19, app. 7)

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
"Members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and other African and Asian countries have tried for almost a decade to keep oil from reaching South Africa." (New York Times, 21 March 1983, D7)

Organization of African Unity
"Since its formation in 1963, the OAU has provided the institutional framework for activity against South Africa by black African states....resolutions calling for commercial, diplomatic, and political sanctions against South Africa have been introduced regularly at the United Nations by the African states." (Study Commission 305)

Australia
Responding to Botha's defiant August 1985 speech rejecting fundamental reform of apartheid system, Australia decides to close its trade office in Johannesburg, ban direct investment in Australia by South African government or its agencies, ban import of krugerrands, end export assistance for Australian firms trading with South Africa. In addition, Australia asks banks, financial institutions to voluntarily cease lending to South Africa, bans export of petroleum products, computers, other products of potential use to South African police or army. Defending "apparent mildness" of actions, Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Hayden says, "The important thing is not to use up all your shots in one volley." (Washington Post, 20 August 1985, A10; Financial Times, 20 August 1985, 1)

Japan
In summer 1986, Japan bans export of computers to South Africa, discourages import of gold coins from South Africa. Following adoption in fall of 1986 of additional sanctions by US, EC, Japan bans imports of iron and steel, restricts travel and tourism to and from South Africa. (Financial Times, 16 June 1986, 2; Lipton 1988, 23)

Southern African Development Coordination Conference
This organization of front-line states estimates that South African "aggression" and "destabilization" have cost its neighbors $10 billion since 1980, including $1.6 billion in direct war damages. Conference Executive Secretary Simba Makoni says, "Sanctions are a road not to a peaceful change but a less violent change." He also says that South Africa's neighbors realize that economic sanctions will hurt them as well, but that they are willing to bear that cost "because there is no other alternative." (Washington Post, 20 November 1985, A24)

In 1983, Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe criticizes Reagan administration policy of "constructive engagement," saying it has encouraged South Africa "to become more aggressive" toward neighboring black-ruled nations. Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda earlier called on West to pressure South Africa, asking, "Why action in [Poland] and no action in [South Africa]?" (Washington Post, 2 April 1983, A16; 19 August 1983, A14)

Writing in Foreign Affairs, Mugabe concedes that "It became clear that some frontline states are not able to impose sanctions because their economies are tied into the South African economy like Siamese twins... Although unable to do so themselves they urge those who can—especially the big powers—to adopt sanctions." Zimbabwe has also taken lead in trying to reduce dependence of front-line states on South Africa for transport routes. "At present, 60 per cent of the external trade of the neighboring countries is said to go to, from or via South Africa." (Washington Post, 11 February 1988, A37; Hayes 79)

Legal Notes

International Court of Justice (ICJ)
In December 1966, ICJ holds that Ethiopia, Liberia do not have standing to challenge South African administration of Namibia. (Doxey 1980, 63)

In January 1971, ICJ upholds Security Council Resolution 276 that ends South African trusteeship of Namibia. (Doxey 1980, 63)

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