Peterson Institute research staff
The Peterson Institute for International Economics is a private, nonprofit, nonpartisan
research institution devoted to the study of international economic policy. More › ›
RSS News Feed Search

Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism: Burma (Myanmar)

Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism

<< Case Studies Index

Case: 88-1
US/EU/Japan v. Burma (1988- : Human rights, democracy, narcotics)

Note: In light of recent events, this case study is currently being updated.
This version provides useful background information.

| Chronology of Key Events | Goals of Sender Country | Local Initiatives |
Response to Target Country
| Attitude of Other Countries | Economic Impact |
Assessment | Author's Summary | Bibliography |

Economic Impact

Observed Economic Statistics

Prior to adoption of new foreign investment law in November 1988, the only foreign company allowed to set up joint venture in Burma was West German engineering firm Fritz Werner, which makes high-grade machinery for manufacturing weapons for Burmese army. (Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 February 1989, 11)

Foreign aid from West Germany, Japan, and United States provided Burma with approximately 90 percent of its foreign-exchange income. Foreign-exchange reserves were down to $10 million in December from $20 million in July 1988. For years after the coup, Burma was unable to service its more than $4 billion foreign debt. (Financial Times, 9 November 1989, 6; Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 December 1989, 22)

"By selling off rights to exploit its natural resources to foreign interests, [Burma] has increased foreign-exchange reserves from less that US$10 million in September 1988 ... to an estimated US$150 million a year later. Burma's reserves have increased further following the signing of contracts for oil exploration with a number of foreign companies.... ;[seven companies] are reported to have paid at least US$5 million each in signing bonuses alone." Government also sells part of its embassy property in Tokyo for over $200 million. Overall, "[d]iplomats estimate that Burma secured at least $1 billion last year from foreign investment." (Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 December 1989, 22; Financial Times, 19 May 1990, II, 1; 25 May 1990, 6)

In mid-1990, satellite surveys show that Burma's teak forests are being felled at a rate that would exhaust them within 15 years. It is estimated that the area cut each year has increased fivefold since the military coup in September 1988: "Faced by an international aid ban for its brutal suppression of pro-democracy demonstrations, [the regime] has exploited Burma's natural resources as its primary source of foreign exchange." (Financial Times, 21 June 1990, 6)

"Development specialists estimate that Burma could easily attract more than $500 million per year from donor countries, but international condemnation of human rights abuses by the military government has reduced annual multilateral foreign development assistance to less than $20 million in recent years." (International Herald Tribune, 26 November 1998, 10)

Burma: Net official development assistance (millions of dollars)


 
US
Japan
Germany
Other
bilateral
Total
bilateral
EU
Multilateral
Total

1985
11.0
154.0
65.0
23.2
255.0
2.1
100.4
355.7
1986
10.0
122.1
22.4
153.2
322.0
14.6
93.4
415.7
1987
2.0
172.0
25.7
41.0
241.0
0.1
126.9
367.7
1988
1.0
259.6
37.1
35.0
333.0
0.3
104.4
437.4
1989
0.0
71.4
4.6
13.9
91.0
1.2
85.2
176.3
1990
0.0
61.3
2.4
19.4
83.0
0.1
80.8
164.0
1991
0.0
84.5
4.0
17.4
109.0
2.7
70.8
179.4
1992
0.0
72.1
3.2
7.4
83.0
0.1
32.3
115.1
1993
1.0
68.6
1.6
6.1
77.3
0.0
24.2
101.5
1994
0.0
133.8
1.4
7.6
142.8
0.1
18.7
161.6
1995
0.0
114.2
1.3
10.7
126.2
2.3
23.3
151.8
1996
0.0
35.2
1.5
8.6
45.3
0.9
10.0
56.2
1997
0.0
14.8
1.4
7.4
23.6
2.7
10.0
50.0
1998
0.3
16.1
1.2
9.8
27.4
2.5
31.3
72.1
1999
-0.4
34.2
1.6
9.3
44.7
1.2
28.6
81.1
2000
3.4
51.8
1.5
11.4
68.1
1.6
37.8
106.8
2001
2.9
69.9
1.8
14.6
89.2
3.8
37.5
127.2
2002
4.8
49.4
1.7
23.2
79.1
8.7
34.0
120.5
2003
5.6
43.1
2.4
32.3
83.4
10.6
35.7
125.8
2004
5.7
26.8
4.7
44.2
81.4
11.1
36.9
121.1

Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients, various editions.



Burma: Inward foreign direct investment flows 1986–1995 (millions of dollars)

 
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

FDI
0.1
-1.54
n/a
56.0
225.1
235.1
149
91.7
135.2
317.6
flows
 
 
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

FDI
580.7
878.8
683.6
304
208
192
191.4
291.2
556.4
flows                    

Source: UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment database, http://stats.unctad.org/FDI.



Burma: Inward foreign direct investment, 1995–2003 (millions of US dollars)

 
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

United States
30.2
14.3
30.6
158.3
0.8
36.4
44.7
98.8
80.4
Japan
0.4
15.6
18.9
33.5
18.8
16.3
7.7
4.6
0.2
European Union
176.5
301.7
492.5
294.8
216.6
69.0
56.4
52.6
10.5

Source: ASEAN Secretariat, Statistics of Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN, 2005 edition.



Burma: Foreign investment, by source country (millions of dollars)

 

Approved up to October 1996

Disbursements 91-96

 

Singapore

1,159

 

112

 

United Kingdoma

1,011

 

145

 

Thailand

946

 

60

 

France

466

 

167

 

Malaysia

446

 

11

 

United States

244

 

220

 

Netherlands

238

 

68

 

a. Includes British Virgin Islands and Bermuda
Source: Myanmar Investment Commission (Myanmar-Recent Economic Developments, IMF, April 1997, 33)

"Private capital inflows to Myanmar have all but evaporated in the face of international sanctions and domestic economic uncertainties. It is estimated that gross international reserves at the end of FY 2001 were sufficient to cover about 2.3 months of imports. Total external debt was estimated to be just over $6 billion in FY 2001 or about 73.4% of GDP, and, of this, $2.5 billion is in arrears following the suspension of payments to multilateral and bilateral creditors in 1997." (Asian Development Bank, Outlook 2003: Economic Trends and Prospects in Developing Asia, 83)

Burma: Primary trade partners, 1995 (millions of dollars)

Imports from

   

Exports to

 

Singapore

701

 

Singapore

192

China

680

 

China

136

Malaysia

255

 

Japan

86

Japan

173

 

EU (total)

76

EU (total)

166

 

Malaysia

63

Thailand

63

 

India

58

Indonesia

51

 

Thailand

37

India

23

 

Indonesia

20

         

Total

2,319

 

Total

1,183


Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1995.
Note: Substantial trade probably goes on across land borders with China and Thailand.
Burma: Primary trade partners in order of importance in 2001 (millions of dollars)

Imports from

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001


World

243.9

194.3

667.7

1067.9

1045.8

1280.1

1538.2

2341.6

2677.8

2861.5

2375.3

2549.7

3053.5

2683.1

 

China

7.7

6.1

137.7

314.8

284.9

357.2

406.0

679.6

573.2

626.7

586.2

447.2

546.1

547.1

Singapore

14.2

11.3

119.2

295.8

288.6

368.0

430.3

701.2

794.1

777.3

501.3

460.2

479.7

465.6

Thailand

1.3

1.1

19.8

4.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

435.3

554.7

390.5

Korea

0.2

0.1

23.3

31.7

34.3

46.2

62.0

95.0

143.9

150.5

163.7

205.9

318.2

255.3

Malaysia

6.3

5.0

31.6

73.7

98.6

114.3

243.5

252.3

242.8

407.5

322.6

257.7

254.1

216.7

Japan

95.2

75.8

110.8

90.8

106.1

110.0

74.6

173.4

279.4

232.2

205.5

203.5

215.6

205.3

European Union

57.3

45.6

103.7

108.8

78.3

119.4

130.6

173.0

212.0

196.9

137.0

134.2

114.5

80.9

                             

Exports to

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001


World

147.4

214.5

408.7

527.0

683.6

864.4

939.8

1197.9

1183.1

1132.1

1184.2

1464.1

2094.0

2753.4

 

Thailand

1.2

1.7

48.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

28.8

36.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

102.6

233.0

735.4

United States

1.1

1.6

9.4

26.6

37.8

45.5

66.0

79.0

105.6

112.2

158.9

222.2

442.7

456.2

European Union

13.2

19.2

28.1

37.2

42.0

63.0

67.6

71.7

101.8

141.8

159.2

209.2

325.9

400.3

India

3.4

4.9

44.2

46.6

94.6

106.5

109.5

145.9

134.9

168.6

215.0

227.3

261.3

288.5

China

1.8

2.6

33.3

96.3

119.3

149.7

129.8

136.0

125.0

66.7

56.0

92.3

113.5

122.0

Singapore

14.3

20.8

46.2

81.0

98.4

101.3

127.5

192.0

190.7

157.2

109.1

90.3

99.8

102.1

Japan

12.3

18.0

28.4

44.9

43.0

65.0

68.8

85.5

93.9

90.0

81.3

92.2

108.4

92.8


Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, CD-ROM, April 2003.

 

Burma: Textile and apparel exports to the United States, 1989-99 (millions of dollars)

A. Textile/Apparel
B. Total exports to US
A/B (percent)

1989  
7.1
 
17.1
 
41.3
 
1990  
9.2
 
22.7
 
40.3
 
1991  
11.5
 
26.8
 
42.8
 
1992  
27.3
 
38.4
 
71.2
 
1993  
30.1
 
46.3
 
64.9
 
1994  
47.0
 
67.2
 
69.9
 
1995  
65.0
 
80.9
 
80.4
 
1996  
83.8
 
107.7
 
77.8
 
1997  
85.6
 
115.3
 
74.2
 
1998  
128.2
 
163.7
 
78.3
 
1999  
185.3
 
231.6
 
80.0
 
2000  
402.8
 
468.1
 
86.0
 
2001  
410.9
 
470.7
 
87.8
 
2002  
302.1
 
355.8
 
85.9
 
2003  
235.8
 
276.4
 
85.3
 
2004  
0.0
 
0.0
 
n/a
 
2005  
0.0
 
62.0
 
0.0
 

Source: US International Trade Commission, USITC Trade Database-Web Access.


"... in 1990, textiles had accounted for some $9 million of Burma's $22 million of exports to the United States, and the value of Burmese textile exports to the United States had already fallen by 21 percent in the first five months of 1991. In any case, Burmese textiles are not embargoed. The absence of an agreement simply allows the United States to impose quotas unilaterally: six textiles categories are subject to quotas." (Bray 56)

In 2003, the Free Burma Coalition releases a press statement claiming that "[a]ccording to newly released statistics from the U.S. Department of Commerce, apparel imports from the Southeast Asian country of Burma dropped by 27% between 2001 and 2002, from $411 million to $303 million. The sharp decrease resulted from the almost-unprecedented decision by 39 major U.S. retailers to forgo doing business with the Burmese military junta… The 39 companies include Wal-Mart, Kenneth Cole, Tommy Hilfinger, Jones of New York, and Federated Department Stores, owners of Macy's and Bloomingdale's." (Free Burma Coalition, Press Release, 25 March 2003)

The United States pledges $3.3 million in 1997 to the UN Drug Control Program in order to fund an alternative development program in Burma. (USIS, 3 April 1998)

Myanmar's investment commission pegs US investment there at $41 million in 11 enterprises (in 1996). However, Pepsi Cola, Amoco, Levi Strauss & Co., Liz Claiborne and Eddie Bauer have backed away from involvement in Myanmar. (Journal of Commerce, 12 July 1996, 2A)

The Myanmar Investment Commission reports that American companies invested more in February 1997--$339 million--than they had in the previous eight years combined. Only $21 million was invested in all of 1995 and 1996. Most of the new investment was in the oil and gas sector. (Financial Times, 25 April 1997, 16)

Burma approved a total of 78 new foreign investments worth $2.8 billion in fiscal year 1996-97, which represents a considerable jump over the 1995-96 level of 39 investments worth $668 million. Observers in Rangoon comment that the US sanctions may have prompted some US companies to rush their 1996-97 investment plans in Burma to beat the deadline before the investment ban went into effect. (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 15 August 1997)

EU-Burma trade totals around $47 million a year. One quarter of this trade is subject to the GSP benefits. (Financial Times, 23 March 1997, 2)

The government's statistics indicate the economy's growth rate has been falling steadily since changes were introduced in 1992 to move the country away from socialism toward a more market-oriented system. Inflation exceeds 30 percent, defense expenditures reportedly consume 50 percent of the budget, and corruption and inefficiency are rife at hundreds of large state-owned corporations or private firms controlled by senior military officers. Without striking a deal with such a firm, or handing over 5 percent-plus commission to a uniformed officer, it is virtually impossible to invest here, according to half a dozen foreign businessmen. (Washington Post, 18 May 1997, A18)

Apple Computer Co. names the Massachusetts law as one reason why it pulled out of Burma. (Journal of Commerce, 29 August 1997, 6A)

"The net effect of these US and international measures has been a further decline of investor confidence in Burma and a deeper stagnation of the Burmese economy. While Burma's economic crisis is largely a result of the SLORC's own heavy-handed mismanagement, the SLORC is unlikely to find a way out of the crisis unless political developments permit an easing of international pressure." (US Department of State, Report to the Congress on US Sanctions on Burma, 5 December 1997)

"Facing an acute shortage of foreign exchange after four years of profligate consumer spending, Burma's military government is, bit by bit, closing its economy off to the outside world again. Imports have virtually ceased and earlier this week nine private banks had their foreign exchange licenses revoked, as the government attempts to re-impose control over contacts and contracts with the world economy." (Financial Times, 14 March 1998, 3)

"A five-year-old ban on new investment by American companies had other political and economic pressure have done little. Instead the generals have strengthened their ties with Asian neighbors, signing trade agreements with China, India, Bangladesh and Thailand." (New York Times, 13 June 2003, A16)

"The sanctions, combined with the Asian financial turmoil, are clearly hurting the Burmese economy. European investors, except oil companies, have generally been scared off by the political risk associated with sanctions. Asian companies who were expected, in the aftermath of Burma's admission to ASEAN, to provide foreign capitals simply do not have the cash to replace US companies." (Financial Times, 5 May 1998, 8)

Swedish telecommunications company Ericsson has decided to end all operations in Burma for fear of US boycotts. With sales of $2.5 million worth in 1997 Burma is one of its smallest markets. Ericsson stresses the decision was taken on commercial grounds. (Financial Times, 2 September 1998, 16)

"...Burma's economy is deeply troubled, plagued by rapid inflation—including rocketing food prices—and a plunging currency. The kyat is now trading at around 1,050 to the dollar, a drop of 31 per cent since April 2002." (Financial Times, 17 January 2003, 5)


Calculated economic impact (annual cost to target country)

Phase I: 1989–2003
 

Reduction in bilateral economic assistance; welfare loss estimated at 90 percent of reduction in average annual flows, 1989–93 compared to 1985–88.

$180 million

   

Loss of US Ex-Im Bank and OPIC loans and guarantees.

Negligible

   

Reduction in US foreign direct investment.a

Negligible

   

Phase I Total

$180 million

   
Phase II: 2004–2006

 

Reduction in bilateral economic assistance (see above for calculation).

$180 million

 

 

Loss of US Ex-Im Bank and OPIC Loans and guarantees.

Negligible

 

 

Reduction in US foreign direct investment.

Negligible

   

Reduction in export to United States; welfare loss estimated at 20 percent of difference in average export volume in 2004–2005 compared to 2001–2003.

$67 million

   

Phase II Total

$247 million

 

Total

$191.2 million


a. Due to interest in oil and gas resources, average annual FDI flows to Burma have increased since 1996.


Relative Magnitudes


Gross indicators of Burma's economy

    GNPa(1988)

$ 11.1 billion

    Population (1988)

40 million

Annual effect of sanctions related to gross indicators

 

    Percentage of GNP

1.7

    Per capita

$4.78

Burma's trade with United States, EU and Japan
as percentage of total trade

 
    Exports (1988)

8

    Imports (1988)

36

Ratio of sender countries GDP ($12,496 billion) to Burma's GNP

1,125


a. By some estimates, black market in Burma may account for as much as 80 percent of economic activity. (Aung-Thwin 149)
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1996; International Trade Statistics, 1996; OECD, Main Economic Indicators, 1991.


Assessment

John Bray
"The decision to release her [Suu Kyi] represents a considerable risk for SLORC, and international pressures may have played a role in persuading it to take the decision to do so. In the United States, Republican Senator Mitch McConnell had been planning to introduce a motion in the Senate calling for economic sanctions against Burma. At the same time the Japanese government had made it clear that Aung San Suu Kyi's detention was one of the principal obstacles to the resumption of yen loans. Burmese officials made a point of informing the Japanese embassy before it told other foreign representatives of her release." (Bray 13)

Far Eastern Economic Review
Unnamed Western diplomat in Burma: "External pressure is ... believed to have played an important role in forcing the [regime] to make sure the polls were not fraudulent …. 'Every time a foreign government condemns human-rights abuses in Burma, the regime loses face in front of its own population, and that's very important.'" Another unnamed diplomat in Rangoon: "[The military] grossly miscalculated the situation. And that's why they didn't try to interfere with the voting. They sincerely believed that the NLD was just a bunch of troublemakers, badly splintered and lacking popular support. They had expected an outcome where no party emerged as the winner, and hence an assembly with no clear cut majority which could be manipulated easily." (Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 June 1990, 11; 14 June 1990, 11)

Professor Donald K. Emmerson, University of Wisconsin
"No other regime has shown itself more willing to disaffiliate and hunker down than Burma's military rulers. During the Cold War Burma not only refused to align itself with East or West, it walked out of the non-aligned movement as well. That record suggests the present junta's invulnerability to isolationist tactics." (International Herald Tribune, 20-21 July 1996, 6)

Leon Hadar
"Unilateral sanctions [against Burma] have alienated our allies in the region and strengthened the hand of China but achieved none of the stated foreign policy aims…" (Hadar 1-15)

Ma Thanegi, Burmese writer
"It is time for those of us in Burma's democracy movement to face up to a difficult truth: ten years after the movement began, we have made almost no progress toward democracy…The National League for democracy has focused on these [sanctions and boycotts] to pressure the military to enter a dialogue. Why didn't the strategy work? It was based on the assumption that the military regime depends on foreign investment to survive…[But the regime] did not topple when the United States and Japan cut off aid. It did not topple when Washington imposed sanctions. In fact, it now seems stronger then ever. The second claim about sanctions is that they hurt only the elite, since ordinary people do not benefit from investment. It is true that the elite is benefiting. But so are ordinary people, who have found jobs in garment factories, construction projects, and hotels…In fact, many of us fear that sanctions are making people more vulnerable." (International Herald Tribune, 20 March 1998, 8)

John J. Brandon, Asia Foundation
"US sanctions-and lesser sanctions imposed by the European Union-have been useful in portraying Myanmar as a pariah state and, to a limited extent, have negatively affected business since they were instituted two years ago. Nonetheless, do unilateral sanctions really matter when the country's military governments have made abominable economic policy decisions for 37 years? More importantly, are they the most effective tool in trying to promote a better future for the land's people? Since their imposition, US sanctions have not had any success in fostering greater democracy or improving the human rights situation in Myanmar. In fact, conditions worsened." (Journal of Commerce, 27 May 1999, 5A)

David I. Steinberg
"The difference in analyses is whether the sanctions were at the heart of the economic downturn and therefore of the willingness of the government to make concessions…I say the sanctions played a minor part." (New York Times, 18 February 2001, 6)

"This incident [May 30] is a major setback for both the internal dialogue process …and externally for those foreigners who were trying to appeal to the more circumspect among the military who realize the dire state of Burma's international relations and internal political economy. …Foreign expressions of outrage may be the final push for the U.S. Congress to enact additional sanctions on that unfortunate country. As a moral statement, it has obvious resonance. But as a practical matter it simply reinforces the sanctions that have hitherto proven inadequate to get reform in that country, and will throw hundreds of thousands of workers, mainly women, out of jobs that are nowhere else available. The proposal to deny visas to all members of the USDA [Union Solidarity and Development Association], as has been mentioned in the press, would isolate further a state and people we should be trying to influence." (Center for Strategic Studies, PacNet Newsletter no. 23, 5 June 2003)

“We seem to believe that sanctions and a broader policy of political and economic quarantine will force change—a highly dubious proposition. The sanctions of 1997 did not work, and no country on Burma’s borders wants them. More sanctions mean simply more isolation. We are cutting off effective contact, reinforcing diplomatic and economic purdah and, rather than bringing change, are virtually mandating a xenophobic military response. We thus limit our potential influence.” (Washington Post, 15 July 2003, A19)

National Bureau of Asian Research
[Its report] argues that US sanctions have undermined reformers within Burma's military who might be inclined to seek a compromise with Ms. Suu Kyi. If anything, the authors write, US sanctions have "strengthened the resolve of the opponents of reform in the military." "The big reason trade sanctions are unlikely to have the impact that Congress would like is that the Burmese regime has quite skillfully . . . worked to build up trade and alliances with its neighbors," argues retired academic John Badgely, who edited the essays. He says there is "almost no consequences to the U.S. pressure" because of Burma's growing ties with China, India and its Southeast Asian neighbors. (Wall Street Journal, 25 March 2004, A15)

Jeffrey D. Sachs
“[S]anctions are mainly a symbolic stand for justice. But they are not symbolic in their effects. They are economically destructive and only occasionally politically productive. America's misguided sanctions against Myanmar, for example, have done nothing in the past year to resolve the country's political and economic crisis… Sanctions should be lifted because they do not work.” (Financial Times, 28 July 2004, 17)


Author's Summary

Overall Assessment

 

Policy result, scaled from 1 (failed) to 4 (success)

2

Sanctions contribution, scaled from 1 (none) to 4 (significant)

2

Success score (policy result times sanctions contribution)scaled from 1 (outright failure) to 16 (significant success)

4

   

Political and Economic Variables

 

Companion policies J (covert), Q (quasi-military), R (regular military)

--

International cooperation with sender, scaled from 1 (none) to 4 (significant)

2

International assistance to target A (if present)

--

Cooperating international organizations

--

Sanction period (years)

12+

Economic health and political stability of target, scaled from 1 (distressed) to 3 (strong)

2

Pre-sanction relations between sender and target, scaled from 1 (antagonistic) to 3(cordial)

2

Regime type of target, scaled from 1 (authoritarian) to 3 (democratic)

1

Type of sanction X (export), M (import), F (financial)

F,M

Cost to sender, scaled from 1 (net gain) to 4 (major loss)

2

Authors' Comment

Although the military regime in Burma has steadfastly refused to honor the 1990 election results, the decision to hold the elections at all, as well as the decision to release Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest appear to have been attributable at least in part to the international pressure, including economic sanctions. An important subsidiary goal has been obtaining cooperation in stanching the flow of drugs, particularly heroin, but the connection to the sanctions has been less clear since both the Bush and Clinton administrations have gone back and forth on whether US assistance for drug interdiction activities should be withdrawn.

Bibliography

Aung-Thwin, Maureen. 1989. Burmese Days. Foreign Affairs 68 143-161.

Banks, S. Arthur, J. Alan Day, C. Thomas Muller. 1997. Political Handbook of the World. New York: CSA Publications, Binghampton University, State University of New York.

Bray, John. 1995. Burma: The Politics of Constructive Engagement. Discussion Paper 58. London: The Royal Institute for International Affairs.

Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 1992. US Economic Sanctions Imposed Against Specific Foreign Countries 1979 to 1992. CRS Report for Congress. 10 August (revised). Washington.

Dobriansky, Paula. 1989. The Fight for Freedom and Democracy in Burma. Current Policy, No. 1227 (November). Washington: US Department of State.

Hadar, Leon T. 1998. US Sanctions Against Burma: A Failure on All Fronts. Cato Institute Trade Policy Analysis No. 1, 26 March.

President's Export Council. 1997. Survey of Unilateral Economic Sanctions. Washington.

Shin, Mia Saw, Alison Krupnick, and Tom Wilson. 1995. Burma or Myanmar? US Policy at the Crossroads. Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research.

US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration. 1990. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States: Burma. FET 90-01 (January). Washington.

US House of Representatives, Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations, and Asian and Pacific, Foreign Affairs Committee. 1989. The Crackdown in Burma: Suppression of the Democracy Movement and Violations of Human Rights. Hearing and Markup on H. Con. Res. 185. (13 September). Washington.

US Department of State. 1997. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices For 1996: Burma. Report submitted to US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 105 Congress, 1 session, January. Washington.

<< top of page