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Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism
<< Case Studies Index
Case 60-3
US v. Cuba (1960- : Castro)
| Chronology of Key Events | Goals of Sender Country | Response to Target Country |
Attitude of Other Countries | Legal Notes | Economic Impact | Assessment |
Author's Summary | Bibliography |
October 1960
President Eisenhower bans exports to Cuba, partly to assist Richard M. Nixon's presidential bid; John F. Kennedy, in response, promises "to do something about Fidel Castro." Initial purpose of sanctions thus is "to destabilize the Castro regime, causing its overthrow, or, at a minimum, to make an example of the regime by inflicting as much damage on it as possible." (Barber 369; Newfarmer 128-29)
April 23, 1964
Under Secretary of State George Ball reformulates purpose of economic sanctions against Cuba: to reduce Castro's ability to export subversion; to show Cuban people that Castro cannot serve their interests; to demonstrate that Communism has no future in Western Hemisphere; to raise cost to USSR of maintaining Communist outpost. (Doxey 37; Roca 88; Bender 29)
February 17, 1978
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Terence A. Todman: "The Carter Administration has begun an effort to improve relations with Cuba, but normalization will take a long time and will depend on many factors, including Cuba's international behavior .... The United States desires: improvement in human rights in Cuba; release of political prisoners, thousands of whom have been jailed for years; more responsible international behavior by Cuba, particularly in Africa; and compensation to U.S. citizens and businesses whose property was taken over by the Cuban Government." (Department of State Bulletin, May 1978, 56-57)
December 15, 1981
Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders: Reagan administration is "tightening the economic embargo" against Cuba in response to Cuban promotion of leftist revolution in Central America, especially El Salvador. (Washington Post, 15 December 1981, A6)
1983
"The objectives pursued by the US in 22 years of economic warfare against Cuba, despite variations in design and scope, can be classified under two major headings: overthrow and containment." (Roca 87)
1995
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) "Fidel Castro is a tyrant. What keeps him in power is money ... from the outside. The [Helms-Burton] legislation will choke off that Castro bonanza ... the life-support system keeping him in power." (United States Information Service [USIS], 22 May 1995)
1999
Alan Larson, US Assistant Secretary of State: "Our policy is to promote a peaceful transition to democracy and respect for human rights in Cuba in four ways: (1) pressure on the government through economic sanctions and the measures delineated in the 1996 Libertad Act; (2) reaching out to and supporting the Cuban people to encourage development of independent civil society; (3) cooperation with the Cuban government on interests of direct concern, particularly to maintain migration in safe orderly and legal channels; and (4) forging a multilateral effort to press for democratic change, respect for human rights, and development of independent civil society."
(USIS, 11 March 1999)
18 May 2001
George W. Bush, US President
Sanctions on Cuba are not just a policy tool, but a “moral statement.” My administration will “…oppose any attempt
to weaken sanctions against Cuba’s government until the
regime…frees its political prisoners, holds democratic, free
elections, and allows for free speech.” US policy is not only
intended to isolate the Cuban government but also to “actively
support those working to bring about democratic change in Cuba.”
(Rennack and Sullivan 2005, 1-2)
1963
Cuba negotiates long-term agreement for sugar sales to USSR at 6 cents per pound, obtains substantial economic aid from USSR. Castro publicly states willingness to reach compensation agreement with US, conditioned on US reparations for damage caused by trade embargo and Bay of Pigs invasion. (Newfarmer 138; Doxey 39)
1975
Cuba begins supporting Marxist factions in Ethiopia, Angola. In 1989, in response to peace initiatives as well as declining Soviet and Cuban interest in Africa, Cuba begins withdrawing its troops from those countries. (Newfarmer 128; Department of State Bulletin, January 1989, 16; Keesing's 37063)
1990
President Fidel Castro: "For decades our plans were based on the existence of a socialist camp, on the existence of several socialist countries in eastern Europe, in addition to the Soviet Union, with whom we signed agreements and established extensive economic relations. We do not know what kind of governments these countries will install. We have no security as to what trade will be like in 1990 and we have complete uncertainty for the period 1991-95 [after the current five-year plan runs out]." (Financial Times, 3 March 1990, 6)
1992
Raul Taladrid, deputy minister of economic collaboration: "Ninety percent of what we imported from US subsidiaries [before the 1992 ban on such transactions] was food, such as basic grains, and medicine. It makes things more difficult and more expensive for us to keep up things like health care and education, but we are doing it." (Washington Post, 17 December 1992, A33)
1996
Foreign Minister Roberto Robaína: "The same as there are mad cows, there are mad legislators." (Journal of Commerce, 31 July 1996, 2A)
2002
Fidel Castro, Cuba’s president: "President Bush’s pledge to maintain trade sanctions on Cuba was an “insult” that “multiplies the honor and glory of our people.” (NY Transfer News, www.blythe.org)
Soviet Union
In 1960, USSR begins extensive program of shipping goods, extending credits to Cuba. (Newfarmer 128) In early 1990, asked whether USSR will cut or eliminate aid as it pursues its own economic reforms, Soviet trade official says, "We recognize the Cuban economy has reached the limit of its possibilities in its present form. The economy is very fragile and we cannot simply stop aid as it would have catastrophic consequences for the Cuban people." (Financial Times, 3 March 1990, 6)
Canada, Mexico, Western European countries
These countries continue commercial relations with Cuba after 1960, extensively transship US goods to Cuba. Canada, Europe oppose post-1990 congressional efforts to extend sanctions extraterritorially. (Losman 29; Inside US Trade, 20 April 1990, 4-6)
Organization of American States
In 1964, 21 of 22 members of OAS (excluding Mexico) suspend all trade, shipping with Cuba. "Every possible effort has been made [by the US] to isolate Cuba economically." (Losman 43) In early 1970s, selected OAS members (Peru, Argentina, Jamaica, Guyana, Barbados) reestablish commercial ties with Cuba; Argentina extends credits to Cuba. (Losman 44) In July 1975, OAS ends sanctions, with approval of 16 countries, including the US. (New York Times, 30 July 1975, A1)
Carlos Salinas, Mexican President
"It is the conviction of Mexicans that this [US] blockade doesn't solve anything. On lifting it, without doubt, bridges of communication and dialogue would be built." (Journal of Commerce, 15 June 1995, 3A)
Andre Ouellet, Canadian Foreign Minister
"We cannot accept that our Canadian firms, who are legitimately doing business in other countries, be restricted by foreign legislations." (Washington Post, 1 April 1995, A17)
"We have made it clear time and time again to the US Congress and Administration that Canada will not tolerate any interference in the sovereignty of Canadian laws." (Inside US Trade, 26 January 1996, 14)
François Mitterrand, French President
"To strangle the people behind the embargo no longer makes sense. Cuba no longer represents any threat whatsoever to world peace or a danger to the Americans." (Washington Post, 10 September 1994, A18)
Andreas Van Agt, EC Ambassador to the United States
"[The EC] cannot accept that the US unilaterally determines and restricts EC economic and commercial relations with any foreign nation, which has not been collectively determined by the United Nations Security Council as a threat to peace or order in the world of nations." (Journal of Commerce, 9 October 1992, 3A)
Javier Solana, Spanish Foreign Minister
"[The United States and Spain] have the same goals, of course. The goal is that Cuba is incorporated into the trend of democracy in Latin America ...we think the embargo is not the best mechanism to change the situation in Cuba. ...We see some contradictions between lifting the embargo on Vietnam and maintaining the embargo on Cuba." (Washington Post, 17 June 1994, A22)
Edwin Carrington, Secretary-General, Caribbean Community and
Common Market (Caricom)
"The Caricom heads of government have made it clear that they do not support the embargo; therefore, any measures such as the Helms-Burton bill which seeks to tighten that embargo and to impose additional measures of a penal nature on Cuba would certainly not be supported by the Caricom states." (Journal of Commerce, 11 October 1995, 3A)
European Union Presidency Statement
"The European Union believes that the United States trade policy towards Cuba is primarily a bilateral issue. However, the European Union has to reiterate its opposition to the extraterritorial aspect of the United States embargo that has been implemented in accordance with the Cuban Democracy Act, of 1992, and the Helms-Burton Act, of 1996.” (http://europa-eu-un.org, 4 November 2003)
1960
US Trading with the Enemy Act classifies as "US affiliate" any foreign firm at least 10 percent of whose equity is owned by US parent; law subjects such affiliates to embargo. Embargo applies to direct contracts, subcontracts. (Hermann 33)
1975
Amendments to Canadian Combines Investigation Act give Canadian Restrictive Trade Practices Commission power to prohibit implementation of foreign judgments, laws, etc., "which would adversely affect [Canadian] competition, efficiency or trade." (Hermann 33)
Fruehauf case (see Legal Notes in Case 49-1, US and CHINCOM v. China [1949-70: Communist Control of China and Korean War]) "should establish the assumption, to be respected by courts of law, that no parent company has the power to compel its foreign subsidiary to disregard local laws." (Hermann 35)
1996
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton Act). Title I codifies existing federal regulations and reaffirms provisions under the Trading with the Enemy Act and the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. Title I also withholds aid from former Soviet republics equal to the amount any state is giving intelligence aid to Cuba, and withholds aid from any country in the amount that it gives nuclear aid to Cuba. Title II delineates the conditions under which the president may provide direct assistance for and otherwise relate to a new or transitional government in Cuba. Title III gives a US citizen the right to sue in US courts foreign companies "trafficking" in a property expropriated by the Cuban government to which the American has a claim. This includes US citizens who at the time of expropriation were Cuban nationals. The president can waive this right for six-month periods on national interest grounds. Title IV denies visas to high-level businessmen and their families if their companies "traffick" in expropriated properties. There is no waiver to this provision. The intelligence and nuclear provisions are subject to a presidential waiver. (Financial Times, 7 March 1996, 5; CSIS Business Alert, 14 May 1996; Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 8-19)
1996
On July 16 President Clinton asserts the right of Americans to sue foreign companies "trafficking" in expropriated Cuban properties after November 1. However, the president issues a six-month waiver on bringing such suits, ending February 1, 1997. He comments, "At the end of the period I will determine whether to end the suspension in whole or in part based upon whether others have joined us in promoting democracy in Cuba." As part of the US-EU agreement on Helms-Burton, the Clinton administration decided to waive Title III indefinitely. (International Herald Tribune, 17 July 1996, 1A; Wall Street Journal, 17 July 1996, A10; Inside US Trade, 22 May 1998, 21; CRS 2006, 15)
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